

# The World's Most Likely Nuclear Flashpoint: South Asia or Korean Peninsula?

By Moeed Yusuf

Ever since the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, nuclear weapons have become an instrument of mass destruction. As nuclear weapons have found their way into new parts of the world, the debate about their effects and dangers has intensified. Apart from the countries that achieved nuclear potential as part of the Cold War apparatus, the world has been very cautious in allowing any other nation to attain such status.

Despite the international community's determination to freeze the spread of nuclear weapons, two South Asian rivals, India and Pakistan, managed to develop a nuclear arsenal and are now the world's only declared nuclear weapon states to have achieved this capability outside the Cold War apparatus. After the end of the Cold War, experts seemed convinced that the India-Pakistan conflict posed the greatest threat in terms of use of nuclear weapons. The consensus was that, if used at all, nuclear weapons would be unleashed by these two South Asian rivals. Intermittently, however, some analysts have tried to make the case that the Korean peninsula might be at higher risk of experiencing a nuclear incident. This view gained prominence during a short-lived crisis triggered by the Democratic Republic of North Korea's near-withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. The debate over the danger of the North Korea-U.S. conflict reaching the nuclear threshold has been rekindled recently after the former's acknowledgment in October 2002 that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

While literature is eloquent about the nuclear dangers emanating from these two conflicts, and while few disagree that any nuclear incident in the near future is most likely to be initiated as part of one of these two conflicts, an objective comparison between the two situations is absent. Here I attempt to fill this void.

Which of these two sites, South Asia<sup>1</sup> or the Korean peninsula,<sup>2</sup> is more likely to produce a nuclear holocaust? The answer lies in an analysis of both situations, including the possibilities of either an intentional launch or some kind of misjudgment or accident. Taking all these factors into consideration, and admitting the potential volatility of North Korea, the India-Pakistan conflict is still the more dangerous of the two.

## THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT

### Background

India and Pakistan have had a troubled relationship since their independence in 1947. Created amidst immense hatred, the territorial dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir has taken center stage for the past five decades (Matinuddin 37). As early as 1974, India managed to test a nuclear device (Hagerty 73). Before India's nuclear test, the two sides had already been embroiled in three armed conflicts. They fought wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, the last leading to a humiliating defeat for Pakistan and dismemberment of its eastern half (now Bangladesh) (Hagerty 67-71). Pakistan's fears about India further increased after India's 1974 nuclear tests, which prompted Pakistan to seek a nuclear weapon of its own. Despite efforts from the international community to undermine Pakistan's efforts, it managed to develop the capability of assembling a nuclear device by the mid-1980s (Matinuddin 93).

Well informed about Pakistan's nuclear program, India is said to have planned a preemptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear facilities in 1984 (Hagerty 85). In 1986-87, the two sides found themselves in the midst of a serious crisis after India conducted an extensive military exercise close to the Pakistani border (Hagerty 96-99). Another major crisis occurred in 1990 when Kashmiri Muslims rose against the Indian installed government in Kashmir and subsequently drew Pakistani support (Matinuddin 42).

In May 1998, India, followed by Pakistan, conducted nuclear weapon tests, India doing so after 24 years and Pakistan joining the club of declared nuclear weapon states for the first time (Synnott 7, 11). Just a year after the nuclear tests, in 1999, the two countries found themselves in the midst of a mini-war at the heights of Kargil in Kashmir (Synnott 35). The years 2001-02 witnessed a near-war with both sides amassing a million troops at their borders after a terrorist attack in India raised tensions ("Pakistan moves troops"). Currently a peace initiative is under way between Pakistan's military-dominated government led by President Parvez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (Mohan). However, still in its infancy, the initiative seems to have stalled already as both sides continue to accuse each other of adopting an uncompromising stance ("India asks Pakistan").

Concerned about the India-Pakistan nuclear weapons, proliferation experts continue to debate the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia. They seem equally worried about both principal ways a nuclear incident can occur: intended launch or accidental use/natural nuclear accident. Each of these is discussed in turn below.

#### Probability of Intended Use

The world can expect to see the intended use of nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan conflict only if either country is faced with a threat to territorial integrity or is in danger of losing its nuclear capability. Neither is it reasonable to assume, nor is it likely, that either India or Pakistan would launch a nuclear strike, absent any overwhelming threat from the other. However, if there is an overwhelming threat and if a crisis does indeed escalate into a full-scale war, or if either country tries to neutralize the other's arsenal by a pre-emptive strike, the consequences could be dire.

Any massive conventional attack in this conflict can only be expected to come from India as part of the ongoing Kashmir conflict, in a quest to split Pakistani territory and advance into mainland Pakistan. Similarly, any attempt at pre-emption is also likely to be initiated by India. Being the much smaller and weaker party, Pakistan cannot be expected to make such moves. An all-out Indian offensive that threatens Pakistani territory or an Indian pre-emptive strike at Pakistan's nuclear facilities in all likelihood will see unconventional<sup>3</sup> retaliation from Pakistan. Pakistan's willingness to use nuclear weapons against India is implicit in its constant refusal to sign a "no first use" treaty with India (Friedman). In addition, Pakistani officials have reiterated time and again that faced with an Indian offensive they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons (Gregory). A Pakistani minister, Javed Qazi stated, "We will use it against India . . . if I am going down the ditch I might as well take the enemy with me" (qtd. in Bidwai). Undoubtedly meant to deter India from contemplating an offensive, such threats are reasonably credible, given that unacceptable damage from a nuclear strike provides Pakistan with its only hope against the much stronger India.

But how likely is it that these South Asian rivals would let a crisis get out of control? In other words, is the danger of an all-out Indian invasion of Pakistan or an Indian attempt at pre-emption real?

India and Pakistan have been through several crises and have managed to keep them below the nuclear threshold. The 1948, 1965, and 1971 crises, which had no nuclear dimension, developed into full-scale wars, while all subsequent crises have either been subdued before developing into conflicts or have been extremely limited due to presence of the nuclear deterrent. During the 1986-87 and 1990 crises, Pakistan's undeclared, albeit widely acknowledged ability to retaliate unconventionally is believed to have kept India from launching a full-scale attack (Hussain 32). During the 1999 and 2001-02 crises, the overt nuclearization of both countries ensured that neither was willing to flirt with the nuclear threshold (Ramana and Reddy 135-137).<sup>4</sup> Keeping the above in mind, it is reasonable to predict, as proliferation optimists often do, that future crises between these two countries are not likely to escalate into full-scale wars, given the danger of nuclear retaliation from the other side.

Moreover, India and Pakistan share a 1,800-mile-long common border ("Halt Mine-Laying"). The mere proximity of these two countries acts as a self-deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons. Both countries realize that the use of nuclear weapons on the other country will likely have massive fallout on their own side.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, the likelihood of an attempt at pre-emption is minimal in this conflict. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals large enough to survive an attempt at pre-emption from the other. Faced with an inevitable nuclear response, neither of the two countries is likely to make this suicidal attempt.

#### Accidental Use or a Nuclear Accident

The second major concern in this South Asian conflict is the likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized launch or a natural accident involving nuclear material. Here, the proximity between the two neighbors exacerbates the danger of an accidental or unauthorized launch. Nuclear-tipped missiles are the most efficient mode of delivering nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan have been actively enhancing their missile delivery systems and one could reasonably assume that both countries would employ missiles for nuclear delivery. Missile flight times between the two countries are only five to fifteen minutes, depending on the launch site and intended target. Subtracting the time required for analysis of an incoming missile and transmission of information, authorities would have only one or two minutes to act (Ramana). Absent any advanced early warning systems, a misjudgment on the part of the analyzers or a false alarm resulting from bad intelligence could result in a nuclear launch. Needless to mention, such a launch would be certain to see a response in kind (Ramana). Even if a crisis in its early stages had not escalated, the inherent lack of trust between the two sides could easily lead one to believe that an enemy launch had actually taken place.

Next, to ensure survivability of their nuclear arsenal, both countries are likely to disperse their arsenal as widely as possible during a crisis. Apparently, neither country possesses adequate communication facilities, which would ensure reliable and swift communication to the dispersed mobile delivery systems in case a nuclear strike is ordered. During a crisis, the fear of losing contact with commanders in the field would likely lead to a delegation of launch authority to individual commanders in charge of the weapons (Friedman). This enhances the likelihood of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons given that neither country has access to Permissive Action Links (PALs) and other sophisticated coding and authentication systems required to enhance the security of a nuclear arsenal (Ahmed and Cortright 94-95).

Finally, there is the issue of nuclear accidents that could result in fallout on the soil of Pakistan or India. While no major nuclear accidents have occurred in South Asia to date, the

safety procedures in Pakistani and Indian nuclear facilities remain unknown. Observers often note that even the highly technical and sophisticated devices set up to avoid accidents during the Cold War failed on numerous occasions (Rajaraman et al.). With an ever-expanding South Asian nuclear arsenal, the chance of a nuclear catastrophe is much greater.

## THE NORTH KOREA-U.S. CONFLICT

### Background

The threat of utilizing nuclear weapons is not new to the Korean peninsula. In fact, the nuclear discussion in the Koreas precedes that in South Asia by two decades. The U.S. repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons against North Korea during the Korean War (1950-53) (“North Korea Nuclear Program”).

Like India and Pakistan, the two Koreas have a history of troubled relationship. North Korea continues to refute the independence of South Korea and claims the Korean peninsula in its entirety as its own territory. In this case, however, the threat of a nuclear conflict lies not between the two directly involved parties, but between North Korea and the U.S., the latter being a South Korean ally and guaranteeing its safety against any aggression from its northern neighbor.

Strongly entrenched in the Soviet camp during the Cold War and having a history of cordial relations with China, North Korea has always had a cold relationship with the U.S. Today, North Korea continues to be one of the few countries to be governed by a communist regime. Despite being a signatory of the NPT (since 1985) North Korea is believed to have pursued a nuclear weapons program in violation of the treaty. It is also alleged to have built a secret nuclear reactor and a reprocessing plant to extract plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon in the mid-1980's. Furthermore, after signing the NPT, North Korea did not allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities as required by the treaty (Jones et al. 147-49). After American attempts to persuade North Korea to soften its stance on the inspections in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the initial cooperation between the two countries finally broke down in 1993 when North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT (“North Korea Nuclear Program”). The 1993 crisis was subdued after former U.S. President Jimmy Carter helped diffuse tensions and facilitated the signing of the “Agreed Framework” between the antagonists. North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program in return for construction of two light water reactors to fulfill its energy needs and delivery of heavy fuel oil from America until the first reactor became operational (Jones et al. 147-49).

The 1994 agreement held in place till very recently, when in October 2002, North Korea dropped a bombshell, so to speak, by admitting to American allegations of the existence of a secret uranium enrichment program (“Nuclear Weapons Program”).<sup>6</sup> To justify its move, the North Korean government accused the U.S. of pressuring it to make added concessions not part of the “Agreed Framework” and of delaying the construction of the reactors. The crisis worsened when the North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors from the country in December 2002, leaving the country's nuclear program completely unmonitored (Borger). Recently, North Korea agreed to take part in multilateral talks, which were held in Beijing in late August (“China Sees”). The talks did not provide any substantial breakthrough, and North Korea has not made clear whether it would participate in further talks.

Unlike the South Asian case, where no single leader has been able to alter substantially the defense policy of his respective country, North Korea's state policies are firmly in control of its leader Kim Jong Il, who has been in power since 1994 and is believed to be the main reason

behind his country's aggressive foreign policy (Cha and Kang 20-21). His regime is authoritarian and public opinion counts little in the formulation of national policies. Jong Il's willingness to follow a coercive course of action time and again against his adversaries has initiated most crises on the Korean peninsula since 1994. Eccentric and enigmatic to the West, he remains, in view of his adversaries, the main barrier to a friendly North Korea.

The current crisis has rekindled the debate over the nuclear dangers on the Korean peninsula. Some analysts believe that North Korea already had enough plutonium to assemble one or two nuclear bombs before it signed the 1994 agreement with the U.S. ("Nuclear Weapons Program"). The status of North Korea's uranium enrichment project is not known but is believed to be only in its initial stages. Estimates of the country's nuclear weapons vary from none at all to one or two to half a dozen ("Nuclear Weapons Program").

#### Probability of Intended Use

The case of intended use in the North Korea-U.S. conflict is more complex than in the India-Pakistan conflict. As in the South Asian case, any major offensive can be expected from the stronger party, in this case the U.S. The possibility of North Korea initiating either a massive conventional attack or a pre-emptive strike against the U.S. is virtually nil. However, unlike South Asia, even if America does attempt pre-emption or initiates a conventional offensive and threatens invasion, North Korea's response is hard to predict. It would depend on whether North Korea is capable of launching a nuclear strike, something far from certain at this point. If it does not have a ready-to-launch weapon, then a successful attempt at pre-emption could settle any qualms about a nuclear catastrophe in the Koreas for the foreseeable future. However, if Kim Jong Il does indeed command a usable nuclear weapon, and if the U.S. cannot neutralize that capability, North Korea will likely launch a nuclear strike. This scenario seems reasonable because North Korea, threatened with a successful U.S. strike that renders its arsenal useless, would act according to the "use 'em or lose 'em" formula. Similarly, if the U.S. attempts an invasion, North Korea can be expected to retaliate unconventionally against the threat to its sovereignty.

But how likely is it that the U.S. will attempt either pre-emption or an invasion of North Korea?

The disparity between the conventional and unconventional capabilities of the U.S. and North Korea is overwhelming, a fact that could exacerbate the chances of a nuclear holocaust on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's incumbent nuclear capability could prompt the U.S. to attempt a pre-emptive strike. Fears of U.S. military action against the regime are already high, largely due to the Bush administration's previous strategy of pre-emption in Iraq. There is a real danger that the expansion of the "War on Terror" engulf North Korea (Kelly). Furthermore, the classic proliferation argument of a superpower fighting on foreign soil applies to this case perfectly. The U.S., not fearing any consequence of retaliation on its own soil, might be more willing to take the offensive on the Korean peninsula.<sup>7</sup>

However, several factors would deter the U.S. from launching any attack against North Korea. It has been argued that a nuclear holocaust in Korea affects not only the U.S. but also South Korea, a directly involved party, and even Japan, which might also be directly targeted in a conflict. The potential hit list also includes China, which has significant influence in Pyongyang (Cirincione 123-32). All these countries have reiterated time and again that they are against any American military action in North Korea (Furukawa; Borger). South Korea and Japan are concerned about a direct retaliation their bellicose neighbor, while China is worried

about loss of influence in the region after a successful U.S. military escapade. The strong opposition of these countries to any military action is a significant restraint on the U.S.

Finally, there is slim chance that the U.S. might not need to use its military might against North Korea to force it to disarm. Analysts point out that Kim Jong II has a history of threatening to employ unconventional weapons to ratchet up a crisis, in effect using nuclear attack as a bargaining tool (Wolfsthal). North Korea, however, is an extremely impoverished and internationally isolated country that many analysts believe would be willing to give up its nuclear program if dealt with properly (Cha and Kang 20-25). In other words, serious economic concessions from the international community might convince the country's leadership to give up the nuclear option. The 1994 "Agreed Framework" is a case in point. In that instance, North Korea agreed to do just that. If a similar scenario unfolds, then the U.S. would not have to contemplate military action against North Korea, and the danger of intentional use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula would be successfully averted.

#### Accidental Use or a Nuclear Accident

Although there has been little debate about the chance of an unauthorized launch or a nuclear accident in the Koreas, the probability of a nuclear catastrophe is low in this case. The U.S. does not have any nuclear weapons currently deployed in South Korea; it withdrew all its nuclear arsenal from the peninsula in 1991 ("North Korea Nuclear Program"). Although North Korea presumably would not have paid much attention to command and control and safety measures at this point, there is not an urgent need to do so. With one or two bombs, no elaborate system is required to ensure the security of the arsenal, be it against an unauthorized launch or a natural accident (Sagan and Waltz 20-21).

The chance of a misjudgment in this case is also not very high. First, since the U.S. does not have nuclear weapons in the Korean neighborhood, the proximity argument presented in the South Asian case does not hold. Second, for the U.S., with its advanced early warning technology, neither the likelihood of a false alarm nor the probability of individual commanders having launch authority is great. On the contrary, North Korea can be expected to launch a strike at the first signs of a U.S. attempt at pre-emption, which might lead to a launch due to misjudgment or a false alarm.

Furthermore, the situation on the Korean peninsula will change significantly if North Korea manages to enhance its arsenal over time, or if other countries in the neighborhood, such as Japan or South Korea itself, develop nuclear capabilities. An expanded North Korean arsenal, given the extreme limitation of resources, will likely have a rudimentary command and control system at best. Similarly, if countries in the Korean neighborhood were to develop nuclear arsenals, the chance of a misjudgment or false alarm triggering a nuclear launch would become high. In other words, the proximity argument presented for South Asia would become valid in this case as well.

#### COMPARISON

Having laid down the incentives for and restraints against the use of nuclear weapons for both conflicts, a comparison of the two situations is in order.

- 1) In both cases, any conflict that has the potential of resulting in a nuclear launch would have to be initiated by the stronger party, namely India or the U.S. Absent any threat to their territory or nuclear arsenal, neither Pakistan nor North Korea is likely to behave irrationally.

2) If either of the weaker parties feels that its nuclear arsenal is threatened by the stronger adversary's strike or that its territorial integrity is in jeopardy from a major military offensive, it can launch a nuclear strike. The only stipulation to this is that North Korea does, in fact, have the capability of retaliating unconventionally, and that if it does, it retaliates before the U.S. is able to neutralize its capability. If that is not the case, then a successful U.S. pre-emption or invasion can settle any fears of nuclear weapon use on the Korean peninsula.

3) The probability of a U.S. attempt at pre-emption of North Korea's known nuclear facilities or a massive conventional offensive against the country is much greater than is the probability of an Indian attempt at pre-emption or invasion of Pakistan. Although America is restrained in its capability to act militarily by involved parties like South Korea and Japan, the Bush administration's policy of pre-emption and the conflict's foreign location can prompt decisive action. In the South Asian case, pre-emption is harder and the proximity of the two countries acts as a self-deterrent as well.

4) Although there is virtually no possibility of disarmament in South Asia, there is a chance that the U.S. and other world powers can convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program in return for serious economic concessions. Such successful disarmament would ensure that a nuclear holocaust on the Korean peninsula is out of question.

5) The chances of misjudgment or a false alarm resulting in a nuclear launch are currently much higher in South Asia than they are in the Korean case. Similarly, South Asia is also at greater risk of an unauthorized launch. However, this situation could change if North Korea develops an extensive arsenal or if Japan or South Korea attains nuclear capability. In such a case, the risks of misjudgment, false alarms, and unauthorized use would increase significantly in the Korean conflict.

6) South Asia is also more likely to experience a nuclear accident at the present moment. Again, if North Korea manages to expand its arsenal or if other countries in the region acquire nuclear weapons, the Koreans will be faced with an increased risk of a nuclear accident.

## CONCLUSION

It is impossible to predict, with any degree of certainty, if nuclear weapons would be part of an escalated India-Pakistan or North Korea-U.S. conflict. It is equally hard to assert, if used, where they are more likely to see action. What can be realistically expected to take place and what can be concluded with some degree of confidence is the following:

- Absent any major offensive from the U.S. or India, or a nuclear accident, no nuclear catastrophe is likely as part of either conflict.
- If the U.S. decides to attempt a pre-emption of North Korea's nuclear facilities or invades the country physically, two outcomes are possible. If North Korea has a ready-to-launch nuclear weapon, it will do so at the first signs that its arsenal is in danger of being neutralized and the Korean peninsula will experience a nuclear holocaust as a result. On the flip side, if North Korea does not have such a capability, or if the U.S. successfully neutralizes its capability before it can retaliate, the Korean peninsula will be a nuclear weapon-free zone for the foreseeable future.
- The India-Pakistan conflict is more likely, at least in the interim period, to witness an accidental launch or a natural nuclear accident. The probability of such an event is obviously not predictable. However, an accident is certainly more likely in South Asia than on the Korean peninsula. With the passage of time, however, if North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal or if countries in the neighborhood like South Korea and Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the risks of

an accidental launch or nuclear accident would increase significantly in the Koreas. At that time, the dangers in both regions would have to be reassessed to determine which one is at greater risk.

The above scenarios provide valuable insight to determine the world's most likely nuclear flashpoint. What will establish which of the two conflicts, if at all, witnesses a nuclear incident is whether any of the above scenarios translates into reality, and in what order. To speculate on that, however, is impossible.

#### Notes

1 In this paper, South Asia is strictly used to refer to the India-Pakistan conflict, and not the region as a whole.

2 "Korean peninsula" or the "Koreas" is used in this text to refer to the North Korea-U.S.-South Korea conflict.

3 In this paper, "unconventional" is used to refer to nuclear weapons use while "conventional" is used to refer to a military offensive without the use of nuclear weapons.

4 This point was reiterated by Gen. Mirza Aslam Baig, former Chief of the Pakistan Army, in a talk delivered at The Brookings Institution on "Peace Options in South Asia," 31 July 2003.

5 Proliferation optimists argue that for any two states in close proximity, the danger of dispersal of nuclear radiation on one's own side will act as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons. See for example the writings of Kenneth Waltz (Sagan and Waltz).

6 Highly enriched uranium is the only other material besides plutonium that can be used in a nuclear weapon.

7 Proliferation experts argue that this situation holds true for any country fighting on foreign soil (Subrahmanyam).

#### Works Cited

Ahmed, Samina, and Daid Cortright, eds. *Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.

Arnett, Eric. "First Strike Could be Key to Islamabad Strategy." *The Times* 29 May 1998  
<<http://www.projects.sipri.se/technology/Times2.html>>.

Beichman, Arnold. "Between Iraq and a Hard Place." *Hoover Digest* No.3 (1998) <<http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/983/beichman.html>>.

Bidwai, Praful. "Smug Nuclear South Asians." *The News* 13 July 2002  
<<http://www.tni.org/archives/bidwai/smug.htm>>.

Borger, Julian. "US Fears N Korea Will Have Nuclear Missile in a Year." *The Guardian* 2 July 2003  
<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/korea/article/0,2763,989367,00.htm>>.

Cha, Victor D., and David C. Kang. "The Korea Crisis." *Foreign Policy* Issue 136 (May/June 2003).

"China Sees N.Korea Crisis Woes, But More Talks." *Dawn* 3 September 2003 <[www.dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com)>.

Cirincione, Joseph. "Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain." *Foreign Policy* Issue 118 (Spring 2000).

Friedman, Benjamin. "India and Pakistan: War in the Nuclear Shadow?" *Center for Defense Information* 18 June 2002 <<http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nuclearshadow-pr.cfm>>.

Furukawa, Katsu. "Japan's View of the Korea Crisis." North Korea Special Collection, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies 25 February 2003  
<<http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/jpndprk.htm>>.

Gregory, Shaun. "Analysis: South Asia's Nuclear Brinkmanship." *BBC News* 29 May 2002 <<http://www.bbc.com>>.

Hagerty, Devin T. *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons From South Asia*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.

"Halt Mine-Laying by India and Pakistan Now." *Progressive Newswire* 16 July 2003  
<<http://www.commondreams.org/news2002/0522-01.htm>>.

Hussain, Mushahid. "A Bomb for Scurity." *Newsline* (November 1991).

"India Asks Pakistan to 'Shun Terror' and Grasp 'Hand of Friendship'." *South Asia Monitor* 9 October 2003  
<<http://www.southasiamonitor.org/thaw/2003/sep/03h1.html>>.

Jones, Rodney W., Mark G. McDonough, Toby F. Dalton, and Gregory D. Koblenz. *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts*, 1998. Washington, D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998.

Kelly, Mick. "U.S. Threatens Korea." *The Guardian* 7 May 2003  
<[http://www.agitprop.org.au/nowar/20030507\\_guardian\\_us\\_threatens\\_nk.htm](http://www.agitprop.org.au/nowar/20030507_guardian_us_threatens_nk.htm)>.

Matinuddin, Kamal. *The Nuclearization of South Asia*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mohan, C. Raja. "Vajpayee's Speech, a Bid to Regain Initiative." *The Hindu* 19 April 2003  
<<http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/...2003041904791100.htm>>.

"N Korea Blames US in Nuclear Row." *BBC News* 25 April 2003 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2974213.stm>>.

"North Korea Nuclear Program Overview: History and Status." *Russian Non-Proliferation Site* 7 (February 2003)  
<<http://www.nuclearno.com/text.asp?5084>>.

"Nuclear Weapons Program: Current Status." *Federation of American Scientists* 4 April 2003  
<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke>>.

"Pakistan Moves Troops to Border." *CNN* 31 May 2002  
<<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WPRLD/asiapcf/south/05/31/kashmir.attack/>>.

Rajaraman, R., M.V. Ramana, and Zia Mian. "Possession and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia." *Economic and Political Weekly* 22 June 2002 <<http://www.epw.org>>.

Ramana, M V. "Risks of a LOW Doctrine." *Economic and Political Weekly* 1 March 2003 <<http://www.epw.org>>.

Ramana, M V., and Rammanohar C. Reddy, eds. *India's Nuclear Fantasies: Costs and Ethics*. Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2003.

Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.

Subrahmanyam, K. "A Reasoned Policy: Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia." *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* (Winter 98-99) <[http://hcs.harvard.edu/~hapr/winter99\\_frontier/issue.html](http://hcs.harvard.edu/~hapr/winter99_frontier/issue.html)>.

Synnott, Hilary. *The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests*, Adelphi Paper 332, The International Institute for Strategic Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Wolfsthal, Jon. "Stop Trying to Isolate North Korea." *International Herald Tribune* 6 February 2003  
<<http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p=8&PublicationID=1185>>.

*Moeed Yusuf is a researcher at the Brookings Institute and a graduate student in International Relations at Boston University. A summa cum laude graduate of Shorter College, Rome, Georgia, where he was a member of the Georgia Theta chapter, Yusuf specializes in the issue of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and has presented numerous papers on the topic, including one at the most recent Alpha Chi national convention. His latest article, dealing with the conflict between Islamic radicals and the U. S., is forthcoming in the International Social Science Review.*