PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
(Spring 2010)
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
Using Evans and PR (4th
ed.)
Set 1
Evans, pp.
17-22, 57-61.
PR, Intro.
Alvin
Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy 1/3 (1984): 235-71, available at http://www.faithandphilosophy.com/article_advice.php
Set 2
Evans, ch.
4.
mystical
experience
numinous
veridical
experience
1. Give three
reasons why some say a direct experience of God is impossible.
2. How do
subjective factors (such as religious experience) affect faith?
PR, Part Two
intro.
1. What kind of
event is a religious experience? Give
three possibilities.
2. Describe
Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity.
3. How does Westphal
understand religious experiences?
PR, pp.
43-50, from W. James, Varieties of
Religious Experience, lectures 16 to beginning of 18, available at Google
books (default edition pp. 536-617).
1. To what four
marks does James appeal to identify mystical experiences?
2. What does
James say about the authority of mystical states?
3. What is the
relation between, on the one hand, religious experience (feeling) and, on the
other hand, philosophy/theology?
Set 3
Evans, pp.
22-35, 195-98.
(classical)
foundationalism
1. Whether it
is impious to think critically about religious belief depends on what two
factors?
2. Explain what
Evans means by “critical dialogue” as an approach to religious matters. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
this approach.
Ibn-Rushd
(Averroës), On the Harmony of Religion
and Philosophy chs. 1-2, available at http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ir/fasl.htm
PR, pp.
92-110, Thomas Aquinas, “The Harmony of Reason and Revelation,” from Summa contra Gentiles Bk. I.3-7,
available at http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc.htm
;
1. If knowledge
of God is based solely on reason, what, according to Aquinas, are three
consequent disadvantages?
2. According to
Aquinas, there are certain truths of faith that we should accept even though we
are unable, by human reason, to see that they are true. What are his reasons for this view?
3. What
similarities do you see between the position of Ibn-Rushd and Aquinas?
Blaise
Pascal, “The Wager”; William Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”; and William
James, “The Will to Believe.”
1. What is
Pascal’s explanation for the fact that some persons find themselves unable to
believe, even when they can see that it would be advantageous for them to do
so?
2. Does
Clifford seem to have a particular kind of evidence for beliefs in mind—and, if
so, what kind? Also, evaluate Clifford’s
understanding of sufficient evidence.
3. Explain what
James means by a “genuine option.” Why
is it especially in cases involving such an option that one may be rational in
accepting a belief that goes beyond the evidence one has?
4. James argues
that our interests and desires—our “passional nature”—do, in fact, have a
considerable influence on what we believe and disbelieve. Is James right about this? If he is, do you also agree with him that
this influence is legitimate?
Set 4
Evans, ch.
2.
polytheism
henotheism
(mono)theism
pantheism
panentheism
PR, Part
Four intro.
1. Why does
this textbook deal with God’s attributes before God’s existence?
2. What are
some of the main alternatives to the theistic view of God (common to Judaism,
Islam, and Christianity)?
PR, pp.
133-43, Moses Maimonides, “Negative Theology,” from Guide for the Perplexed, I.53, 58-59, available at http://www.sacred-texts.com/jud/gfp/gfp003.htm
; Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia.xxv.3,
available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP.ii.FP_Q25.FP_Q25_A3.html
; and George Mavrodes, “Some Puzzles concerning Omnipotence.”
1. Maimonides
and other Jewish thinkers do say of God that God is “powerful and knowing and
willing.” Yet these are positive
statements and so (according to him) do not properly apply to God. What is it, then, that is being said about God
when these statements are made?
2. When Aquinas
says that God is omnipotent and can do “all things,” why is it necessary for
him to state clearly what is included under the word all?
3. Give a brief
but clear explanation of Mavrodes’ answer to the question of why the “paradox
of the stone” does not undermine the claim that God is omnipotent.
Set 5
Evans, ch.
3.
1. Describe the
four broad classes of arguments for God’s existence.
2. Describe
three common objections to the cosmological argument.
3. According to
E., how does the question of God’s existence differ from the question of the
existence of, say, the Loch Ness monster?
4. What are
three lines of response to the evolutionary challenge to the teleological
argument?
PR, Part
Five intro.
a priori
a posteriori
PR, pp.
169-73, from Anselm, Proslogion chs.
2-4; and Gaunilo, (Appendix) On Behalf of
the Fool 2-6; available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/anselm/basic_works.html
1. In your own
words, how does Anselm argue for God’s existence?
2. On what
grounds does Gaunilo question whether he can have the understanding of God that
Anselm thinks leads to showing that God exists, and what does Gaunilo think
follows from this questioning?
PR, pp.
184-86, from Aquinas, Summa contra
Gentiles
1. What is
Aquinas’ argument for God’s existence from motion?
PR, pp.
212-14, from W. Paley, Natural Theology,
ch. 1, available at Google books
1. What analogy
does Paley use to construct his teleological argument for the existence of a
Creator?
Set 6
Evans, pp.
183-211.
evidentialism
properly basic
belief
hermeneutical
circle
cumulative case
1. What does E.
think about “pragmatic arguments” against theistic belief?
2. What are the
two lines of response to the evidentialist challenge?
3. What does E.
mean by a “nonalgorithmic type of rationality?”
4. What does
true religious belief have to do with a way of life?
PR, pp.
246-55, from A. Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology.”
1. What is
natural theology?
2. According to
Calvin, what impedes the sensus
divinitatis?
3. What is a
noetic structure?
4. What is the
difference between weak and strong foundationalism?
Set 7
Evans, ch.
7.
moral evil
natural evil
logical problem
of evil
evidential
problem of evil
1. What has the
argument from evil been used to demonstrate?
2. What is the
difference between a theodicy and a defense?
3. What two
attributes of God seem to contradict the existence of evil?
4. What does E.
mean by reasonable epistemic access, and how does this apply to the problem of
evil?
5. What does E.
mean by “mild hell?”
PR, pp.
276-87, from D. Hume, Dialogues
concerning Natural Religion, part X, available at http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/dnr.htm#A11
; and Gottfried Leibniz, “Best of All Possible Worlds Theodicy.”
1. In Hume’s Dialogues, what does Philo say about
human misery?
2. Reconstruct
and evaluate Philo’s case for how anthropomorphisms of God’s attributes (e.g.,
justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude) have implications for how a being
who possesses them would act with respect to evil.
3. Reconstruct
Leibniz’s argument that God would choose to create the best of all possible
worlds. Which aspects of this argument
seem strong to you? Which ones seem
weak?
4. How
effective is the argument that all evil in the world is justified by being
connected to a greater good—that is, to the world’s being the best
possible? Is this sufficient to justify
the divine permission of evil?
Set 8
Evans, pp.
42-52.
compatibilism
middle
knowledge
open theism
1. What are
four ways of resolving divine foreknowledge and human freedom?
PR, Part
Eight intro.
process theism
divine
determinism
libertarianism
PR, pp.
150-59, from Boethius, De consolatione
philosophiae Bk. 5, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/boethius/consolation.vi.html
; and Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God Is Everlasting.”
1. How does
Boethius define eternity?
2. How does
Boethius solve the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom?
3. Wolterstorff
argues that God must be thought of as “everlasting,” rather than
“eternal.” Explain what is meant by
these two contrasting terms.
4. Wolterstorff
lays great emphasis on the Bible’s depiction of God as acting within human life
and history. Why does this depiction lead
him to say that God must be understood as temporal (everlasting), rather than
timeless (eternal)?
PR, pp.
348-63, from P. Helm, The Providence of
God; and David Basinger, “Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian
Thought.”
1. Describe the
“risky” view of God’s providence that Helm opposes.
2. What does it
mean to say that a passage of Scripture is an instance of “accommodation?” Why does Helm believe that certain passages
must be viewed as accommodation? Does
this view of Helm strike you as plausible and satisfying?
3. Explain
briefly Basinger’s reasons for saying that a God with middle knowledge is much
better able to exercise providential control in the world than a God with only
“present knowledge.”
4. Basinger
argues that if God has only “simple foreknowledge” of the actual future, this
does not give God significantly more control than if he has only present
knowledge. Explain Basinger’s reasons
for this claim.
Set 9
Evans, pp.
52-55.
logical
positivism
verifiability
theory
analytic
propositions
synthetic
propositions
1. What is the
main problem with the verifiability criterion?
PR, Part
Nine intro.
univocal
equivocal
analogical
blik
PR, pp.
391-97, from Aquinas, Summa theologiae
Ia.xiii.5 resp., and Disputed Questions
on Truth 2.11; and A. Flew and B. Mitchell, “The Falsification Debate.”
1. Aquinas
considers how we apply predicates to creatures and to God. What does it mean to apply predicates to
anything? What is the relation between
predicates (linguistic elements) and attributes (ontological elements)?
2. Mitchell
disagrees with Flew that nothing counts against religious beliefs but argues
that religious faith does not let anything count decisively against its beliefs. How does his story make this point?
PR, pp.
404-08, from R. Ruether, Sexism and
God-Talk.
1. Describe how
Ruether thinks that ancient patriarchal societies gave rise to male monotheism,
that is, a masculine concept of God.
According to R., what problems has male monotheism caused?
2. How does
biblical theology itself contradict male monotheism?
Set 10
Evans, ch.
5.
Enlightenment
rationalism
1. What is the
relationship between special revelation and miracles?
2. What are the
three different theories about special revelation?
3. The
non-propositional view is often associated with what theological movement?
4. According to
Hume, what is the probability of a miracle occurring, and what is his
reasoning?
PR, pp.
441-54, from Hume, “Of Miracles”; and J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism.
1. What is
Hume’s “general maxim” at the outset of the discussion?
2. The reported
reappearance of a missing leg is the type of claim that Hume thinks we ought to
reject. Are there conceivable conditions
under which you would consider it reasonable to believe such a claim were true?
3. Why does
Mackie believe that any evidence supporting the belief that an event is really
a violation of a natural law is at the same time evidence against the belief
that the event actually occurred as reported or observed? Did you find his argument convincing?
4. What is the
double burden for those who accept that a miracle occurred, and what double
line of defense does the one denying miracles possess?
Set 11
Evans, ch.
6.
philosophical
naturalism
methodological
naturalism
1. How does
modern science pose a challenge to Christian faith?
2. Is
methodological naturalism incompatible with Christian theism?
3. Explain
Freud’s challenge to religious belief.
4. What does
the sociological/psychological critic lack in making the case against theism?
PR, pp.
523-26, from R. Dawkins, “Science Discredits Religion.”
1. What are
some theological teachings that have logical implications for science,
according to Dawkins?
PR, pp.
10-18, from Daniel Dennett, “An Evolutionary Account of Religion,” from Breaking the Spell
1. How does
Dennett connect evolution with religion?
2. How does
Dennett assess the benefit of religion, and what might be his prognostication
for its survival?
David B.
Hart, “Daniel Dennett Hunts the Snark,” available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/01/003-daniel-dennett-hunts-the-snark-15
1. How does
Hart sum up Dennett’s Breaking the Spell?
2. What are two
reasons Hart sees the book as pointless?
3. What
“genetic fallacy” does Dennett commit?
4. What is
Hart’s final prescription for Dennett?